TIME: Almanac 1995

home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search

/ TIME: Almanac 1995 / TIME Almanac 1995.iso / time / 111593 / 11159925.000 < prev next >

Wrap

Text File | 1994-03-25 | 9.1 KB | 182 lines

<text id=93TT0525> <title> Nov. 15, 1993: Should NATO Move East? </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1993 Nov. 15, 1993 A Christian In Winter:Billy Graham </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> DEFENSE, Page 68 Should NATO Move East? </hdr> <body> Old enemies from the Warsaw Pact are keen to join the Western alliance, but Moscow frowns on the idea By BRUCE W. NELAN--Reported by David Aikman/Washington, Sally B. Donnelly/Moscow and James O. Jackson/Bonn It is the autumn of 1998. Hungary's democratic government, outraged at the treatment of 1.8 million ethnic Hungarians in neighboring Romania, threatens to take back the region of Transylvania by force. Bulgaria backs Romania. Farther north, Ukraine's government is shaken by an ultimatum from Moscow: Hand over all nuclear weapons or face a pre-emptive strike. Hungary and Ukraine turn immediately to their NATO allies for support. NATO allies? Well, not yet, but the door to the Atlantic alliance is opening, and the former Warsaw Pact nations, eager to enlist, could join before the turn of the century. Sounds like a good idea, bringing all of the Continent under one protective umbrella. But if the U.S. and its NATO allies would not fight for blood-soaked Bosnia and Herzegovina, will they do so for Hungary? How about Poland in a clash with Russia? Do the Atlantic democracies have the will and the resources to spread their security guarantees over Central and Eastern Europe, taking on the unending feuds, ethnic hatreds and border disputes that have poisoned the region for centuries? And if they do, are they also prepared for the hostile reaction the move will trigger in a Russia that looks westward with as much suspicion as envy? Is there any virtue in a new NATO that shifts the Iron Curtain back to Russia's very borders? These are not academic questions. Bill Clinton has called a NATO summit to convene in Brussels next Jan. 10, to plan the organization's march eastward. The meeting, Secretary of State Warren Christopher told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week, will "formally open the door to an evolutionary process of NATO expansion." He had just returned from an eight-day trip to the old Warsaw Pact countries to "renew" NATO and polish a plan to enlist those former Soviet satellites that are making visible progress toward democracy. "The alliance must embrace innovation or risk irrelevance," he reported to Congress. He even discussed the proposed expansion with Boris Yeltsin and found the Russian President "very positive." Maybe so, but the Russians have not been happy with such a prospect up to now. Anything positive Yeltsin might have said to Christopher was more likely in response to a go-slow signal coming from NATO defense ministers when they met last month in Travemunde, Germany. Under the ambiguous slogan "Partnership for Peace," the military chiefs made it clear that East European states would not be joining the alliance any time soon. They would be offered military cooperation agreements, but not full membership in NATO--which today includes 16 states--until some vague point in the future. It is only membership that brings the gilt-edged security guarantee: an attack on one is to be considered an attack on all. Not long ago, when the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were all collapsing, many experts thought NATO had served its purpose and its demise would soon follow. Now the East Europeans are clamoring for protection from--depending on their location--Russia, Germany, Ukraine or one another. The preferred solution of each is full NATO membership, an ambition that could mesh with the West's desire to find a post-cold war role for the alliance and a new world order that works. The most eloquent spokesman for embracing the East is Czech President Vaclav Havel. He argued last month that "we have always belonged to the Western sphere of European civilization and share the values upon which NATO was founded and which it exists to defend." The alliance as an institution has always been popular among Washington officials because it provides the most direct channel to inject U.S. interests into European policymaking. But all the talk about stretching NATO's front line has touched off an intense debate inside the Clinton Administration. In general the Pentagon opposes the rapid inclusion of Eastern states on military grounds, while the State Department tends to view such inclusion as a mechanism for advancing democracy, market economics and Western values. "If we do not export stability," says German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe, "we will import instability." Those opposed to the concept argue that growing bigger could introduce enough regional quarrels to unravel NATO. The skeptics warn particularly against isolating and antagonizing Russia, creating threats that do not now exist. Though Christopher and Defense Secretary Les Aspin say the republics of the former Soviet Union, including Russia, could become eligible to join in the future, there is no realistic chance Moscow would sign on as a junior partner in an alliance dominated by the U.S. and Germany. Announcing a new postcommunist military doctrine last week, Russia's security chiefs declared that they view no country or alliance as an enemy. At the same time, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev took a dim view of NATO's moving its flags and formations closer to the Russian border. " NATO is a military alliance," he said. "So what does it need new members for? Against whom is it aimed?" Yeltsin appeared to bless Poland's membership last August. But two weeks later, he sent a letter to the leading NATO capitals to say Moscow did not approve of enlarging the alliance in the near term. Some experts saw in that the hand of military hard-liners, but Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, a supporter of strong ties with the West, was also quietly warning allied governments against isolating Russia. "We call on East Europeans and NATO to think again," says a senior Russian diplomat, "whether there is much sense in expanding NATO today when neither NATO nor Eastern Europe is threatened by anybody." Fears of a new Iron Curtain coming down between Russia and Eastern Europe are widespread in Moscow, but NATO Secretary-General Manfred Worner insists they are misplaced. "Nothing this alliance will do will be against Russia," he insists. East European leaders say much the same thing and suggest that a solid phalanx of new NATO states in the region would be a force for stability. In fact, the former Warsaw Pact countries make little secret that what they want most is protection--mainly against Russia. After the armed insurrection in Moscow last month, the Polish government's National Security Office publicly admonished, "Recent events in Russia are the latest indication of the importance and significance of our future membership in NATO." In private, senior Polish and Hungarian diplomats worry aloud about possible trouble not only from Russia, but also from a nuclear-armed Ukraine, which they say is "as dangerous as the Russians," and from Germany, which they still do not trust. Those who want a bigger NATO use the words stability and instability constantly but do not explain how a military alliance that was created specifically to confront and contain the Soviet Union can provide the answers for a region in which the main problems are economic and political. The stresses inside the new democracies in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic do not arise from external threats. The advocates also tend to underplay the importance Russia still bears on the world scene, especially in Europe. "If you cannot involve the Russians, there is no way you can protect these countries," says Uwe Nerlich, a deputy director of Germany's Research Institute for International Politics and Security. Nerlich suggests the former Warsaw Pact states should pool their forces by creating their own military alliance, which would work out security arrangements with both NATO and Russia. Senior British officials look favorably on this kind of approach, and so do the French. Earlier this year Prime Minister Edouard Balladur presented the European Community with a plan to encourage the East Europeans to negotiate bilateral treaties. In the midst of this far-reaching debate, the U.S. seems to have decided to temporize, hoping to codify the Partnership for Peace compromise at next January's summit. The Russians would be happy with an approach that would not admit any new members to NATO in the near future. Refusing to be discouraged, the East Europeans are pretending the Partnership is a step forward. "We want full membership," says a Polish diplomat, "but we are in no position to turn any association down." NATO's present members, though they have little to fear from foes these days, must soon decide whom it would be wise to befriend. </body> </article> </text>